I.B.TAURIS

ERDOGAN'S EMPIRE

Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East

SONER CAGAPTAY

ERDOGAN'S EMPIRE

Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East

SONER CAGAPTAY

I.B. TAURIS
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

I.B. TAURIS
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2020

Cover design by Charlotte James
Cover image © Sean Gallup / Staff / Getty Images

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-1-7883-1739-9
ePDF: 978-1-7867-3597-3
eBook: 978-1-7867-2634-6

Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed and bound in Great Britain

To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

In loving memory of my father . . .

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix
List of abbreviations xi
Prologue xv

Introduction: A trip to Istanbul 1

1 Osman's dream 9

2 Restoring Turks' dignity – as Muslims 25

3 'Strategic Depth' 41

4 Building soft power 61

5 Europe's slap 73

6 An American affair 89

7 The Syrian disaster 111

8 Menacing Russians 137

9 Competing Persians 155

10 Erdogan's Arab fall 169

11 Uncomfortable Ottomans 183

12 Course correction 199

13 Erdogan vs Trump 217

14 Erdogan's Empire – Part I: East Africa 231

15 Erdogan's Empire – Part II: 'Bayram Belt' 249

16 Turkey and the West: A never-ending love affair 265

Conclusion: How can Turkey become Great? 283

Notes 303
Bibliography 335
Index 357

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2D2	Anti-Access/Air Denial
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKP	Justice and Development Party
AMISOM	African Union Mission for Somalia
ANAP	Motherland Party
AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BTC	Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline
CAATSA	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
CDU	Christian Democrat Union
CENTCOM	Central Command (US)
CHP	Republican People's Party
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DENK	Denk political party
DOST	Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance
DP	Democrat Party (Turkish)
DPS	Movement for Rights and Freedoms

DYP	True Path Party
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command (US)
EUFOR	European Union Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FP	Virtue Party
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HDP	People's Democratic Party
HLSCC	High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Turkish–Tunisian)
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISIS	Islamic State in Syria and Iraq
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KDPI	Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIT	National Intelligence Organization

MSP	National Salvation Party
MTTB	National Turkish Student Union
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPSD	National Freedom and Dignity Party
NSC	National Security Council (Turkish)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCDK	Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party
PiS	Law and Justice Party
PJAK	Kurdistan Free Life Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PYD	Democratic Union Party
RP	Welfare Party
SAC	Syrian Arab Coalition
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SDP	Social Democrat Party (German)
SFG	Somali Federal Government
SNC	Syrian National Council
SOCOM	Special Operations Command (US)
SP	Felicity Party

TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TANAP	Trans-Anatolian Pipeline
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
THKP-C	People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TURKONFED	Turkish Federation of Entrepreneurs and Business World
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
UAR	United Arab Republic
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
YPG	People's Protection Units

PROLOGUE

Nations that were once great empires, such as Turkey, often have an inflated sense of their heyday. This, of course, leads to a readiness to be inspired, or a vulnerability to be manipulated, by effective politicians who are able to embody and speak to this narrative. Understanding the importance of Turkey's imperial past is essential to understanding modern Turkey. This is because a romantic view of the collapsed Ottoman Empire continues to shape the views held by Turkish citizens of their place in the world.

Enter Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country's president, who has held sway since 2003. Erdogan, who has won thirteen nationwide polls, consolidating power in Turkey over decades, is the country's most consequential and powerful leader, probably since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who, in 1923, established modern Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.

The Romans measured time by *saecula* – the number of years that had to pass between the time of the occurrence of an incident and the death of all the people who were alive at the time of this incident. Ataturk's republic is not *yet* one *saeculum* old, and the shared, and malleable, memory of Ottoman greatness resonates deeply with Turkey's citizens.

For hundreds of years, the Ottomans dominated what are now nearly fifty sovereign countries – a quarter of the current UN member states – spanning three continents (Africa, Asia and Europe). However, starting in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire went into a long and steady decline. Aware of their country's weakness, successive generations of Turkish leaders latched their country's foreign policy onto that of a global power or international bloc in the West, while waiting for Turkey's greatness to return.

Ataturk, a general in the Ottoman army, founded modern Turkey in his own image as a secular, European state. After he deposed the sultans, he turned Turkey's face further to the West. By copying European states, the great global powers of the interwar era, in statecraft, he aimed to place Turkey on a trajectory which would lead to the great nation status that was Turkey's birthright.

Inspired by European traditions, Ataturk's secularism mandated freedom *from* religion in government, politics and the education system. A Jacobin politician, Ataturk ran the country with an iron fist until his death in 1938. He left behind a secularist system of government based on his principles, also known as Kemalism. Ismet Inonu, who followed Ataturk as the country's second president, perpetuated his Kemalist legacy. But he ruled Turkey with an even stronger fist. It was not until 1950 that the country's first fully free and fair elections were held.

After Turkey became a multiparty democracy in 1950, Ataturk and Inonu's democratically elected successors for decades perpetuated their secularist legacy. These Kemalists believed that Ataturk's political system was durable, and should not be changed as the world changes.

Until Erdogan. Turkey's twenty-first-century leader hails from a tradition of political Islam, which seeks to blend a religious and political style that has been growing in the country during the late twentieth century, starkly opposing Ataturk's secularism. Since coming to power in 2003, Erdogan has revolutionised Turkish politics, and in doing so has proven the Kemalists wrong.

Ataturk ruled Turkey for fifteen years between 1923 and 1938. Erdogan has already governed from Ankara for over sixteen. He has successfully torn down, or recalibrated, much of Ataturk's legacy. In addition, under him, the country has reverted to an authoritarian style of government, ironically more reminiscent of the Ataturk and Inonu years than of late twentieth-century Turkey.

As the new 'Ataturk', Erdogan has recast Turkey top-down in *his* own image: as profoundly Islamic and socially conservative. Moreover, Erdogan's 'new Turkey' primarily faces not Europe, or the West, but the Middle East. Erdogan wants to see Ankara rising as a great power with and through influence over Muslims across Turkey's former Ottoman possessions – especially the Middle East, but also in the Balkans beyond.

Erdogan's quest to seek greatness for Turkey is not unusual, however. It is, in many ways, a continuation of the policies of the country's Turkish leaders, from the late Ottoman sultans to Ataturk, all of whom sought to revive Turkey's great power status. However, Erdogan's path is different compared to his predecessors. While they folded Turkey under the West to restore its global influence, Erdogan has picked an unorthodox model: his goal is to make Turkey great as a *stand-alone* power. First, in the Middle East and then globally.

A populist politician, Erdogan does not shy away from using this foreign policy vision to mobilise his right-wing base. The first four chapters of this book, beginning with the Introduction, explain Erdogan's rise and consolidation of power, and the nativist thinking that often, together with Ankara's national security concerns and historic patterns of Turkish foreign policy, informs his key international decisions.

Erdogan has delivered strong economic growth during the last decade, lifting many of his conservative supporters out of poverty, also creating a base of followers who adore him. Turkey's economic growth in the past decade has endowed it with increased regional influence. This is one reason for which Erdogan has pivoted the country towards the Middle East, as a way to enjoy the fruits of its newfound power, shown in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 details Turkey's simultaneously ebbing political relationship with Europe; and Chapter 6 describes Ankara's evolving relationship with Washington during the same timeframe, under presidents George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama.

The Kemalist constitution of Turkey, framed after Ataturk's thinking, remains however, and during the early years of the last decade, Turkey's secularist military and high courts loyal to Ataturk's legacy boxed in Erdogan and his political Islamist vision in government. Consequently, Erdogan then tried to implement a better version of late-Kemalist foreign policy, more tolerant, more European, more internationalist. For instance, he tried to unify Cyprus in 2004, supporting a UN-backed plan, which, nevertheless, failed (explained in Chapter 12).

Between 2008 and 2011, Erdogan took over the reins and complete power in Turkey. A referendum he won in 2010 allowed him to reappoint a majority of the judges to the high courts, without a confirmation process. Simultaneously, Erdogan defanged the secularist Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) with help of the Gulen movement, his ally at the time.

A religious order-cum-political network established in the 1970s by Turkish Muslim cleric, Fethullah Gulen, the Gulen movement played a key role in Erdogan's power consolidation. It helped build the kangaroo court Ergenekon–Sledgehammer cases (covered in the Introduction), alleging that there was a court plot against Erdogan, and then arrested a large number of generals, as well as Erdogan's secularist opponents, from journalists to university professors, thereby creating a 'republic of fear', in which opposing Erdogan became a crime.

In 2011, the military's top brass bowed to Erdogan and Gulen, resigning *en masse*. This ushered in a new dynamic: Erdogan and Gulen, each wanting to control Turkey by himself, split ways. This was the beginning of a long political fight that culminated in 2016 in the failed coup against Erdogan, in which Gulen-aligned officers seem to have played a key role.

Meanwhile, Erdogan's increasing power allowed him room to move forward with his foreign policy vision. During the ensuing second Erdogan era in Turkey between 2011 and the 2016 failed coup, Erdogan embraced an ambitious programme of neo-Ottoman and regional power initiatives, with help from his foreign minister-turned prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The unfolding Arab uprisings at the time provided this vision with opportunities in the Middle East – as Erdogan and Davutoglu saw it. Most notably, during the Arab uprisings, Erdogan (and Davutoglu) supported the Muslim Brotherhood, a political Islamist movement. They also decoupled Ankara from Israel, and Erdogan tried to make peace with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) at home.

In its support for the anti-Assad rebels in Syria (covered in Chapter 7), Turkey butted heads with Russia and Iran, its historic adversaries. These policies refreshed threatening and old rivalries with Moscow and Tehran (covered in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively). Overall, Erdogan's Middle East initiatives left Turkey isolated and with no friends in the region, except for Qatar. Most notably, Ankara's ties with Egypt and Middle Eastern monarchies aligned with Saudi Arabia suffered severely because of Erdogan's (and Davutoglu's) support of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab uprisings (Chapters 10 and 11). Finally, the US–Turkish relationship started to zigzag in this period because of policy differences between Ankara and Washington regarding the Syrian Civil War.

The post-failed coup period

In 2016, a final and complete rupture between Erdogan and Gulen came, following the attempted coup against Erdogan. After the failure of the putsch, Erdogan not only pursued suspected coup plotters, such as Gulenists, but also used his post-coup state of emergency powers to carry out a more sweeping crackdown across Turkish society, consciously brutalising many of his opponents. Talks with the PKK collapsed in July 2015, casting Ankara and the group's Syrian offshoot, the People's Protection Units (YPG) as enemies in that country's civil war.

Further, in foreign policy, the November 2015 'plane crisis', in which Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that had violated its airspace from Syria, ushered in new problems. Following the crisis, Russian President Vladimir Putin slapped hefty sanctions on Ankara, and threatened to attack Turkish operations in Syria. Erdogan's call to have NATO missile defence systems placed in Turkey to protect it against Moscow failed to produce a strong show of support from Ankara's transatlantic allies – at least as Erdogan saw it.

Realising the risks of Turkey's complete isolation internationally, Erdogan fired Davutoglu in early 2016, launching an initiative to repair Turkey's ties with some of its neighbours, including Iraq and Israel (covered in Chapter 12), but also to make up with Putin, entering into negotiations with him to bring to an end Syria's war.

In another pragmatic turn, since 2017, Erdogan has tried to make a deal with US President Donald J. Trump regarding the many issues that continue to divide Ankara and Washington (Chapter 13). Recently, Erdogan has pivoted to new areas beyond the Middle East to offset his losses there, and to procure Turkish influence elsewhere – this time with some successes, most notably in East Africa (Chapter 14), as well as the Balkans, Black Sea Basin and Central Asia, i.e. the 'Bayram Belt' (Chapter 15).

The post-2017 environment also saw Erdogan's efforts to rebuild Ankara's links with Europe, underlining the importance of the deep financial and economic links that tie Turkey to the 'Strategic West' – i.e. the collective membership of NATO and of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Chapter 16).

A resource-poor country, and despite Erdogan's efforts, Turkey depends on the Strategic West to grow. Although Erdogan has recalibrated Ankara's political ties with Europe and the USA over the past decade, in terms of trade and incoming investment, the Strategic West still dominates in Turkey – and Erdogan relies on it to win elections. He has constantly scored victories at the ballot box, mainly on a platform of strong economic growth. In this regard, Turkey's economic slowdown in 2018 presents a challenge both to him and to Turkey, as does the alarming departure of educated citizens escaping his authoritarian grip – Turkey cannot become a great power, if smart and globally connected citizens leave in exodus and international capital avoids the country.

Last, the Kurdish issue, too, presents a challenge to Erdogan – and Turkey. The war in Syria has internationalised Turkey's Kurdish problem, linking the PKK in Turkey and the YPG in Syria. Erdogan should not, and cannot, leave the resolution of this problem to the USA or his adversaries, such as Assad, Iran and Russia, which have historic ties with the PKK.

Can Erdogan fix all these problems, and deliver Turkey back to safety, even greatness? What are the risks that lie ahead for him, and for the country? How can Turkey truly become a great power, fulfiling a dream shared by many of its citizens, the sultans, Ataturk and Erdogan himself? I have tried to provide answers to these questions in the concluding chapter of the book.

INTRODUCTION
A TRIP TO ISTANBUL

A mosque befitting a sultan

In September 2018, during a trip to Istanbul, I saw the construction site of the cavernous Camlica Mosque, a Muslim edifice built under the supervision of its patron, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

During my visit away from Washington, DC, as I woke up each day to the sound of the Muslim call for prayer pouring over Istanbul, I could pick out the Camlica Mosque almost instantly. Seen from miles away, the mosque's nearly 72 metre (236 feet) high dome dwarfs Istanbul's skyline. The mosque rises on the slopes of Istanbul's highest hill, measuring 268 metres (879 feet) at its highest point. I returned to Washington, convinced that the Camlica Mosque expressed Erdogan's grand political vision in physical form.

The Camlica Mosque is the first mosque of this magnitude formally sponsored by a Turkish leader in Istanbul since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. At that time, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, an Ottoman army general, liberated Turkey from Allied occupation.[1] He then established modern Turkey in 1923, as a republic, installing a secularist system of government. His secularism, borrowed from the French model, mandated no religion in governmental affairs, politics or education. Ataturk ruled Turkey with an authoritarian grip, until his death in 1938.

Istanbul is a city of mosques and the politics that surround them. Just as Erdogan is demonstrating his power by building *his* mosque in Turkey's biggest city, Ataturk did so as well by converting the Hagia Sofia Mosque, Istanbul's Byzantine-era cathedral church, transfigured

into a mosque in 1453 by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II, into a secular museum in 1935. Through this representational and political act of 'undoing a mosque', Ataturk signalled that he wanted religion out of politics. In another symbolic act, he moved Turkey's capital from Istanbul to Ankara, signalling – this time geographically and politically – his new republic's turn away from its Ottoman past. Subsequently, Ataturk pivoted Turkey to face the West, embracing European culture.

While Ataturk 'de-mosqued' Hagia Sofia to underline his vision, Erdogan's patronage of the grand Camlica Mosque, already dubbed so-called 'Erdogan's Mosque', in the former Ottoman royal capital, testifies to Erdogan's own vision. The 'new Turkey' Erdogan would like is a profoundly Islamic and socially conservative society, one that faces towards the Middle East. What is more, in this 'new Turkey', Islam is enmeshed in politics, instead of being firewalled from it – in even sharper contrast to Ataturk's vision.

Meet Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Following the tradition of Ottoman sultans, who built imperial mosques to adorn the seven hills of Istanbul's historic old city, Erdogan has constructed his mosque near modern Istanbul's highest point, creating a visual eighth hill for the Turkish megalopolis. Even more poignantly, the Camlica Mosque is adorned with six minarets, numerically competing in glory with the seventeenth-century Blue Mosque, the only other mosque in Istanbul with as many minarets. By physically soaring above the city's imperial mosques, the Camlica Mosque announces the ascent in the former Ottoman capital of a new sultan: Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The Camlica Mosque sits at the geographic centre of greater Istanbul, a city of over 15 million people, and allows the Turkish leader to imprint his legacy permanently on the city of his birth and political ascent. It has been an extraordinary rise for the man elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994.

In June 2018, 24 years later, he won fresh parliamentary and presidential elections, with a slim majority, which fully put into place changes approved by an earlier 2017 referendum. Erdogan is now head of state, head of government, head of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), de facto head of the Police (a national force in Turkey under

the control of the Interior Ministry), and commander in chief of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).

Erdogan, who hails from a modest and pious family, was born in Istanbul in 1954, in the gritty and working-class neighbourhood of Kasimpasa. He entered politics in Istanbul in the 1970s, embracing political Islam at a time when Turkey was an officially secularist society, and starting his fight against the country's political system. Erdogan's rise to power was not smooth. During his ascent, he was briefly jailed in 1999 for reciting an allegedly incendiary poem that Turkey's secularist courts said undermined the country's political system.

Following the collapse of Turkey's traditionally secular parties during the country's devastating 2000–2001 economic crisis, Erdogan came to power through his AKP, which emerged as Turkey's leading party in the November 2002 parliamentary elections. Erdogan's brand as the pious, and therefore politically clean, guy from the other side of the tracks at a time when many of the secular parties he defeated in the 2002 elections were notoriously corrupt, played a key role in his victory at the polls.

He became prime minister in March 2003,[2] and has won numerous elections since, primarily because he delivered phenomenal economic growth, especially during his first decade in power. This has built him a base of loyal and mostly conservative supporters. He has won over a dozen elections since 2002 and consolidated immense power in his hands.

While I was a PhD candidate at Yale University studying Turkish and Balkan history, I worked as a tour guide in Istanbul in the 1990s to make ends meet. The sheer size of Istanbul's Ottoman-era mosques impressed me every time I guided tour groups through these historic landmarks.

I was always particularly awed when viewing another of Istanbul's glorious mosques: the Mosque of Suleyman I, the Magnificent. Suleyman I, probably the greatest of the Ottoman sultans, built this mosque in the sixteenth century at the height of Ottoman power. Signalling imperial glory, for centuries, the dome of 'Suleyman's Mosque', standing at 53 metres (174 feet), hovered over Istanbul's silhouette, and dominated the other mosques and monuments across the city's skyline, including the Hagia Sofia and the Blue Mosque.

At the time, I thought that an edifice matching Suleyman's Mosque could not be built in Istanbul – ever. In height, so-called 'Erdogan's

Mosque' easily surpasses Suleyman's Mosque. I returned to Washington, DC, thinking that Erdogan had outdone even Suleyman.

Inventor of twenty-first-century populism

Ataturk ran Turkey with an iron grip. A Jacobin politician, Turkey's founder shaped the twentieth-century country in his image as a Western staunchly secular society. Importantly, he did not eliminate or suppress Islam as a religion. Rather, he created a secularist system that essentially controlled religion and marginalised citizens, such as Erdogan later on, who identified primarily through Islam. Ataturk banished Islam to the private sphere, while removing the direct influence of religious institutions and leaders over politics.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his followers – named 'Kemalists', after his original last name – were supremely self-assured in the secularist system they built. Their confidence was embedded in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), from which Ataturk hailed, and which saw itself as the protector of the country's secularist political system after the leader's death in 1938.

The secularist system Ataturk left in place was, however, modified by TAF following the 1980 coup. At that time, the generals' takeover aimed at curbing the rise of the leftist ideology in the country, as well as ending the developing civil war as fighting had broken out on the streets between left- and right-wing militia. Confined by these circumstances, the military decided to allow minimal, yet noteworthy, forms of Islam to penetrate the country's political and education systems. The generals believed that religion could stymie the rising tide of leftist sentiment in the country, 'inoculating' Turkish society against communism. In the 1980s and 1990s, these policies increased Islam's visibility in the public sphere in the country. Ironically, these dynamics, unleashed by the secularist generals, allowed political Islam to take root in Turkey. Again ironically, taking advantage of these dynamics to come to power in 2003, Erdogan has since recalibrated and dismantled Ataturk's secularism in just over a decade – and has done so with little mercy for his opponents.

Turkey is often considered a country that follows trends invented in the West and Europe. This has generally been the case since the early nineteenth century, when Ottoman sultans Westernised and Europeanised the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while transitioning to the twentieth century, Ataturk and his followers looked to Europe and the West for clues in statecraft and foreign policy. In Erdogan's case, however, we see a unique interaction, in which a Turkish leader both turns East and sets a political trend for the West. Erdogan is *the* global prototype of populist leaders we are seeing in the twenty-first century – he can take credit for inventing a new breed of nativist politics, a trend which has been copied by effective populist leaders elsewhere.

Erdogan has brutalised and cracked down on demographic groups, from leftists to liberals, who are unlikely to vote for him. In order to build and boost his base, he demonises his challengers, often attacking those who oppose him, saying that they act as 'foreign proxies', who want to undermine him and, therefore, Turkey. This opposition, which constitutes nearly half of the country, simply loathes him. The strategy, however, has won him a loyal base of mostly conservative followers, demographics that includes centre-right, right-wing as well as political Islamist voters. Erdogan lifted many of these citizens out of poverty with his successful economic policies and, for that ,reason they adore him and want to keep him in power.

Enter the New Sultan

Erdogan's efforts to take over Turkey's political system have included tactful approaches, meticulous strategising, and patient steps. After coming to power, he delivered robust economic growth and, as a result, gradually built his popular electoral support. Following his second electoral win in parliamentary elections in 2007, and taking stock of his rising popularity (at the time, 46 per cent of the electorate voted for his party, AKP, up from 34 in 2002, constituting Turkey's largest electoral mandate in decades), he started to amass power, eroding democratic checks and balances.

Subsequently, he was able to take control of much of the media, using state watchdogs, and also the courts, following a 2010 referendum, which gave him the prerogative to appoint a majority of

judges to high benches without a confirmation process.[3] Erdogan also started to crack down on his opposition at this time, beginning with the Kemalists, who wanted Turkey to stay on the West-facing and secularist path envisioned by its founder.

During a set of kangaroo trials between 2008 and 2011, he targeted, delegitimised and punished his secularist opponents.[4] The Gulen movement, which was established in the 1970s, and had gradually grown in power in the 1980s and 1990s, became a strong Erdogan ally after the 2002 elections, helping him in this process.

In 2008, Gulen's network of supporters in the country's police and judiciary helped Erdogan imprison nearly a quarter of Turkey's active duty generals and admirals in the secularist TAF, alleging that these officers were involved in the so-called Ergenekon coup plot to overthrow the government. Again, with Gulenist help, Erdogan jailed a number of prominent secular intellectuals, journalists and civil society activists, alleging in media, such as pro-Gulen daily *Zaman*, that these groups were part of the coup plot against him.[5] The prosecutors could not provide a convincing and persuasive account of the purported secularist coup, but the Ergenekon–Sledgehammer cases allowed Erdogan to jail dissidents, kicking off an authoritarian trend in Turkish politics, with him on top.

The generals caved in. Soon after the TAF's top brass resigned en masse in 2011, bowing to Erdogan's power, the courts started throwing out the indictments. Still, the Ergenekon–Sledgehammer cases permeated Turkish politics, producing the dangerous idea that opposing Erdogan equalled plotting coups.

This created an environment of intimidation, in which Erdogan and his allies, including Gulen at the time, could openly harass dissidents. The Ergenekon trials had sent a message to anyone opposing him that they could easily be jailed, their private phone conversations or emails could be leaked to the public, or they could be linked to coup plotters by the pro-Erdogan media. This made it infinitely more difficult for Turks of all stripes to oppose Erdogan, creating a 'republic of fear', enabling the leader's authoritarian style.

In control of Turkey, Erdogan has since flooded its political and educational systems with rigidly conservative Islam.[6] This is, paradoxically, Erdogan's 'Ataturk' side. Of course, Erdogan does not share Ataturk's values, just his methods. Just as Ataturk shaped Turkey

in his own image, creating a secularist, European society, Erdogan is shaping a 'new Turkey', which is socially conservative and which embraces political Islamism as a key value – in *his* own image.

And the crisis of Turkey

In fact, however, Erdogan is an anti-Ataturk 'Ataturk'. Having grown up in secularist Turkey and faced social exclusion at a young age due to his piety and conservative views (explained in further detail in Chapter 2), he was motivated by deep-rooted animosity towards Ataturk's ways. Yet, he has dismantled Ataturk's system by using the very tools that Ataturk and the country's founding elites provided him: power of state institutions and top-down social engineering – both hallmarks of Ataturk's reforms. Erdogan has used Ataturk's means and methods to replace even Ataturk himself. The product is that now Turkey discriminates against citizens who do not primarily identify through Islam, more specifically, conservative Sunni Islam, to which Erdogan belongs.

However, Erdogan has a problem: whereas Ataturk came to power as a military general, Erdogan has a democratic mandate to govern. What is more, today's Turkey is split nearly in the middle between pro- and anti-Erdogan camps. Despite these facts, Erdogan desperately wants to change the country in his own image, and herein lies the crisis of modern Turkey: while half of the county embraces Erdogan's brand of politics, the other half vehemently opposes it. So long as Turkey is genuinely democratic, Erdogan cannot complete his revolution.

This has grown Erdogan's illiberal side: in order to push forward with his platform of revolutionary change against a split society, Erdogan has subverted the country's democracy. Instead of delivering more liberties for all, he has cracked down on his opponents and locked up dissidents, providing liberties only for his conservative and even much narrower political Islamist base.

Erdogan has accomplished this by playing the 'authoritarian underdog'. Building on his narrative of political martyrdom under the secularist system in the 1990s, including the brief jail term that he served in 1999, Erdogan now portrays himself as a victim who is, grudgingly, forced to suppress those conspiring to undermine his authority. He intimidates the media and the business community through

politically motivated tax audits, and jails dissidents, scholars and journalists.

In addition, his police regularly crack down on peaceful opposition rallies. Accordingly, although Turkey's elections continue to be mostly free, they are increasingly not fair. These developments have compounded polarisation in Turkey: Erdogan's conservative base has zealously banded around him in his defence; the other half of the country, brutalised by Erdogan, holds a profound resentment against him. Increasingly, there is little common ground between these constituencies.[7]

However, he has managed to survive, winning thirteen nationwide polls since 2002. He scored victories in at least the first eleven of these elections, following fair races. By putting large parts of the media in the hands of his cronies and gaining nearly unfettered access to state resources, he was able to stack enough of the odds in his favour in the most recent April 2017 referendum and June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections to eke out victories.

At this stage, it is implausible that the Turkish leader will be voted out. In other words, Erdogan, who has already ruled Turkey longer than Ataturk, is here to stay, as is his vision to reshape Turkey as a profoundly Islamic and socially conservative society. So is his foreign policy model for the country: a 'new Turkey', which faces the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries beyond, with a desire to rise with and through influence over Muslims – 'in the mould of the Ottoman Empire'.

INDEX

Abdulhamid II 10, 11, 42, 55, 56, 57, 186, 233, 296
Adana, Protocol of 1998 114
Aden 41, 62, 245
Adivar, Halie Edip 27
Afghanistan 49, 61, 69
Africa xv, 9, 17, 66–7
  East 21, 179, 189, 231–48, 251, 295
  North 45, 66, 106, 171, 177, 197, 249, 281
  sub-Saharan 17, 50, 66, 239, 247
  Turkey's opening 45
African Union (AU) 66, 239
Afrin 122, 149, 218, 221, 270, 289
  2018 Turkish incursion into 149, 152
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 158
Ahrar al-Sham 133
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Station 145
Alawites 113
Albania 17, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253
Alevis 250, 253
Alexandretta 69, 112
  see also Hatay
Algeria 41, 238
al-Qaeda 97, 98, 118, 122, 123, 128, 129, 130, 133, 240
'Anatolian Tigers' 64
Anitkabir (Ataturk's mausoleum) 28, 232, 287
Ankara
  Battle of 22
  Treaty in 1920 112, 127
Anti Access/Air Denial (A2D2) 24, 154
anti-Americanism/anti-Westernism 15, 94, 147, 266, 272
  and the 'Hood Incident' 92–4
anti-secularism in Turkey 34
anti-Semitism 34, 92–4
Arab Spring 105, 110, 178
Arabian Gulf 41, 46, 63, 122, 166, 180, 189, 209, 241, 270
  War of 1990 15, 91
Argentina 12
Armenians/Armenia 11, 17, 24, 43, 44, 46, 70, 104, 154, 170, 214–15, 254, 257, 258, 272
Asia xv, 9, 192
  Central xix, 16, 18, 45, 47, 56, 61, 139, 140, 150, 192, 231, 233, 235, 249, 254–7, 261
  East 45, 229
  South 45, 233
Assad, Bashar al- 72, 106, 114, 115, 204
Assad, Hafez al- 114, 115, 204
Assyrians 117, 134
Astana 134
  peace talks on Syria 134, 149, 257
  see also Kazakhstan

Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal 154, 157, 161, 167, 186, 189, 203, 211, 233, 235, 236, 256, 258, 269, 284, 286, 287, 294–6
Athens 12, 14, 16, 17, 46, 65, 174, 210, 211, 213, 215–16, 217, 258, 274
see also Greece
Atilla, Mehmet 220
see also Halkbank
authoritarianism/authoritarian 14, 141, 157, 208, 256, 293
in Turkey xvi, xx, 1, 6, 7, 22, 23, 27, 51, 83, 86, 175, 176, 290, 298
Azerbaijan 17, 70, 139, 165, 214–15, 232, 237, 254–5, 257, 299

Baath Party 113, 123, 160, 291
Baghdad 72, 91, 99, 122, 137, 160, 161, 199, 200–2, 203, 204, 205
see also Iraq
Baku 214–15, 260
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) 17, 143–4
see also Azerbaijan
Balkans xvi, 15, 42, 61, 67, 70, 170, 192, 232, 237, 249–55
Balkan Pact 12, 69, 251
Balkan Wars 11, 68
Turkish foreign policy in xix, 17, 19, 21, 45, 47, 231, 249–54, 262, 270, 288, 295
Basra 43, 189, 201, 202
Bayar, Celal 14, 27, 28, 31
Beijing 20, 234, 275, 276, 277, 280
see also China
Beirut 115, 169
see also Lebanon
Belgium 12, 183, 279
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 276
Berlin 10–11, 13, 57, 79, 122, 266, 274
see also Germany
Berlusconi, Silvio 142
Beyoglu 28
Bitola/Monastir 26
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 17, 259
Blue Mosque 2, 3, 158
Blue Stream gas pipeline 140, 144
Bodrum 72
Bosnia and Herzegovina 249, 252, 254
Bosporus Strait 41
Bozdag, Bekir 146
Brandt, Willy 47
Brasilia 103
see also Brazil
Bratislava 74
see also Slovakia
Brazil 12, 103, 104, 193, 235
Brunson, Andrew 43, 44, 98
crisis 19, 223–5, 268, 275, 293, 297
Brussels 71, 74–5, 77–8, 80–1, 86–8, 97, 142, 193, 250, 254, 270, 271, 280, 297
see also European Union (EU)
Bucharest 258
see also Romania
Bulgaria 12, 17, 42, 46, 67, 68, 70, 137, 138, 143, 233, 234, 237, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257–9, 260, 261–2
Bush, George W. xvii, 71, 75, 93, 94, 96–100, 223–4, 271

Cairo 108, 171–2, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183–7, 189, 206, 240, 244, 246
see also Egypt
Camlica Mosque 1–2
Canada 100
Caracas 65
see also Venezuela
Caspian Sea 45, 144
Caucasus 16, 18, 42, 45, 57, 61, 67, 138, 139, 140, 150, 155, 170, 235, 249, 254, 286

Cem, Ismail 16, 46, 47
Cemal Pasha 57, 169–70
centre-left in Turkey 5, 7, 18, 23, 46, 76, 84, 86, 97, 99, 107, 152, 156, 204, 266, 271, 298, 300–1
centre-right in Turkey 5, 27–8, 29, 35, 36, 75
Chechens 42, 140, 150–1
Chechnya 140
Cheney, Dick 89, 96
Chernomyrdin, Victor, 140
China 139, 193, 229, 234, 246, 269, 275–7, 278–80, 294, 295–6
Chisinau 258
  see also Moldova
Christian Democrat Union (CDU) 79
Ciller, Tansu 15, 51, 76
Circassians 42, 150, 170, 187
Cold War 10, 13, 14–15, 17, 32, 33, 47, 73, 112, 113–14, 139, 140, 143, 187, 228, 237, 258, 276, 284
communism/communist 4, 11, 16, 32, 33, 61, 139, 213, 250, 251, 253, 256, 258, 261, 262, 277
  anti-communism in Turkey 4
conservatism/conservative xvi, 2, 6, 7, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 37, 38, 39, 52, 53, 75, 102, 105, 199, 229, 287, 290, 291
  base of Erdogan xvii, 3, 5, 7, 8, 39, 40, 266, 290, 291
  business community in Turkey 63
  in Turkey 2, 6, 7, 8, 18, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 99, 290
conspiracy theories
  in Turkey 34, 39
constitutional court (Turkey) 32, 76, 77–8, 90, 98
corruption in Turkey 35, 36, 148, 220
Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) 153
coups and coup attempts in Turkey
  1960 15
  1980 4, 15, 48
  1997 "soft coup" 76, 77, 174, 176
  2007 "E-coup" 77
  2016 failed coup xviii, xix, 21–3, 146–8, 162, 191, 192, 194, 218, 219, 223, 265–6
Crete 42
Crimea 23, 138, 153, 260–1
  Khanate 261
  Tatars in 187, 259, 260, 261
  see also Ukraine
Crimean War of 1853–6 10
Croatia 17, 80, 82
Cyprus xvii, 12, 14, 41, 43, 212–13, 214, 258, 270
  blocking Turkey's accession into the EU 74, 78–82
  coup of 1974 15
  ethnic violence 14
  Greek Cypriots 14, 211
  Turkish Cypriots 14, 211
  Turkish invasion of 1974 19, 223
  U.S. arms embargo against Turkey 15
  Zurich Agreement of 1959 14
Czech Republic 284

da Silva, Luiz Inacio Lula 103, 159
Daghestanis 42
Damascus 71–2, 111–35, 149, 161, 169, 183, 184, 204, 206, 290
  see also Syria
Davutoglu, Ahmet xviii, xix, 45–50, 54, 55, 56–9, 61, 66, 71, 72, 89, 90, 96, 105, 115, 116, 131–5, 143, 158, 167, 171, 183–5, 188, 193–8, 199, 201, 205, 231, 235, 238, 240, 251, 252, 253, 256, 259, 265

Demirel, Suleyman 15–16, 18, 29, 47, 51, 140, 271
Democrat Party (DP) 14, 15, 27, 35
Democratic Union Party (PYD) 121–2, 124–5, 130, 151, 227–8, 290
Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance (DOST) 137, 237, 262
DENK 237, 262
Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) 236
Diyanet 27, 234, 236, 237, 251
Dodecanese Islands 12
Doha 164, 178, 179, 180, 184, 188–90, 240, 241, 243–6
  see also Qatar
Druze 42, 117, 134
Duda, Andrzej 87

EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 254
East Ghouta 149
Eastern Question 9, 186
Ecevit, Bulent 15, 47, 89, 91, 93, 140
economic crisis 224, 275, 292
  1990s and 2001 3, 35, 91
  "global", of 2008 85
economic growth 69, 84, 273
  under Erdogan xvii, xx, 3, 5, 20, 34, 40, 157, 238, 281, 292
education 4, 6, 25, 26, 30–1, 34, 35, 39, 44, 84, 192, 232, 258, 295, 299, 300
  secular xvi, 1, 12, 26–8, 30–1, 53, 105
  see also Imam Hatip schools
Edward VIII 12
Egypt xviii, 20, 95, 104, 106–8, 113, 120, 164, 171–7, 178, 179, 184, 185–7, 189, 206, 236, 241, 244, 245–6
Elections in Turkey 8, 27, 36, 76, 90, 97, 130, 175, 184, 274
  1950 parliamentary xvi, 14, 27
  November 2002 parliamentary 3, 6, 36, 89
  2007 parliamentary 5
  June 2018 presidential and parliamentary 2, 196
  see also referendum
elite/elites 7, 21, 28, 29, 30, 34, 43, 45, 51, 64, 96, 105, 133, 187, 192, 277, 285, 294, 298, 299
Enver Pasha 57
Erbakan, Necmettin 33, 34, 48, 76, 158
Erdogan Model 97
Erdogan, Bilal 142
Erdogan, Emine 93
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip
  authoritarianism 83, 86, 298
  childhood 3, 28–33
  imprisonment of 3
  as Istanbul's mayor 2, 31, 76
  legacy of 2, 225, 284, 302
  rise to power as prime minister and AKP head 2, 3, 5, 18, 32, 35–6, 75, 76, 77, 78, 90, 95, 106, 141, 150, 158
Euphrates Shield operation 218–19
European Community (EC) 16, 51, 74
European Economic Community (EEC) 16
  Ankara Agreement of 1963 16, 73, 80
European Union (EU)
  Customs Union of 73, 74, 81, 88, 269, 280
  demise of Turkish accession talks with 66, 74, 80, 85, 88, 275
  and the Schengen Area 71, 195
  Strategy for Enlargement 80
  Turkish accession talks with 66, 77, 79–82, 85, 87, 88
European Union Force (EUFOR) 254

Europeanisation
of the Ottoman Empire 5
of Turkey, 11–13
see also Westernisation

F-35 fighter jet program 153, 222, 223
Felicity Party (SP) 75, 97, 175
Fidan, Hakan 173
First World War xv, 11, 25, 37, 43, 44, 56, 67, 68, 82–3, 112, 122, 151, 169, 170, 181, 189, 196, 197, 258, 270, 295
Foley, James 125
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 59, 86, 87, 237, 273, 275, 279–80
France 10, 11, 12, 41, 53, 57, 66, 79, 81, 195, 270
colonial rule in Syria 112
Francis I 53
Free Syrian Army (FSA) 109, 118, 124, 125, 130, 134

Gaddafi, Mu'ammar 105, 118, 131, 183
Gates, Robert 103
Gaza 95, 96, 101, 171–2, 189, 207
war of 2006 93, 94
gender gap
in Turkey 84
Geneva
peace talks on Syria 134
see also Switzerland
Georgia 17, 30, 232, 254, 260
Germany 10, 12, 47, 55–6, 75, 79, 253, 274
Nazi 13, 266
non-aggression pact with Turkey 13
Gezi Park rallies 107, 120, 173, 175–6, 184, 290
Golden Horn 28, 30
Gramsci, Antonio 37
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 244, 245
Great Britain 10, 11, 12, 14, 56, 57, 78, 138, 170, 186, 189, 195
Great War 11
Greece 11, 13, 14, 26, 42, 47, 67, 79, 101, 132, 187, 194–5, 199, 211–14, 251, 258
and Cyprus 14, 15, 75
rapproachment with Turkey in 1990s 16
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 69, 70, 193, 275, 278
Gul, Abdullah 47, 90, 95, 215, 252, 298
Gulen movement
alliance with Erdogan xvii–xviii, 6, 191, 239
and Ergenekon 6, 78, 191
failed coup of 2016 22, 147, 176, 194, 223, 231–4
overseas network 140, 192, 232, 239, 254, 257
role in foreign policy 16, 191, 192, 231, 251, 291
schools 140, 192, 232
split with Erdogan (corruption scandal December 2013) xix–xx, 191, 220, 291
in the US 146, 162
see also Fetullah Gulen
Gulen, Fetullah xviii, 23, 146, 218, 223
see also Gulen movement
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 164, 176, 178, 180, 190, 233, 241, 243, 244, 279, 280, 289, 293

Habsburgs 267
Hagia Sofia 1, 2, 3
Halkbank 220–1
Hamas 21, 95–6, 103, 171, 178, 179, 205, 207, 209, 289, 293

hard power 193–6, 229, 249
Hariri, Rafic 115
Hatay 69, 112–13, 114, 121
Hezbollah 134, 180, 206
High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Turkish–Tunisian) (HLSCC) 177–8
hijab 294
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) 102
Huntington, Samuel 49–50

Imam Hatip schools 28, 31
  cadres ???
  opening of 28
  perception of 31
  see also education
Imrali 115
Incirlik Air Base 127, 280
income
  in Turkey and its neighbours 70, 84, 188, 293, 301
India 10, 41, 56, 170, 235, 241
Ingushes 42
Inonu, Ismet xvi, 13–16, 27, 30, 50
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 173, 275, 292
Iran
  economy of 69, 70
  Kurds in 121–2, 160, 162–4, 200–5
  and political Islam 33, 150, 158
  population of 68, 69, 70
  proxies of 134, 161
  relations with Ottoman Empire 9, 137, 155–6
  relations with Turkey 20, 46, 49, 54, 69, 72, 104, 155, 156–67, 200–5, 289, 293
  sanctions on 103, 220–1, 224
  in Syria xviii 20–1, 23, 111, 149, 159–60
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 157, 160, 163
Iraq
  War of 2003 89, 199
Iron Curtain
  fall of 16
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 102, 108–10, 123, 124–7, 129–31, 132, 149, 151, 176, 196, 201, 202, 217, 218, 219, 225, 226, 227, 229, 281
Islamism/political Islam in Turkey xvi, xvii, 3, 4, 5, 7, 18, 20, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 48, 51, 53, 54, 75, 93, 96, 97, 150, 157, 158, 174, 175, 177, 179, 183, 266, 268, 296
Israel
  relations with Turkey xviii, xix, 15–16, 17, 21, 46, 47, 51, 93, 94, 95–6, 101–3, 104, 115, 171, 187, 199, 205–6, 207, 208–9, 210, 289
Israeli–Palestinian conflict 93, 95, 101, 207, 209
Istanbul
  during Erdogan's mayoral term 2
  as Ottoman capital 2, 10, 55, 138
  Russian threat to 10, 138
Italy 11, 12, 71, 177, 238, 270
Izkowitz, Norman 156
Izmir 43, 64, 259

Jabhat al-Nusra 122
Jarablus 149, 218, 221, 270
Jerusalem 16, 96, 206
  see also Israel
Jews
  Turkish Islamist views towards 33, 39, 63, 93, 94, 197, 285, 296, 297
jihadism 123–6, 129
Jinping, Xi 277
Jordan 20, 178, 179, 196, 209
Juncker, Jean-Claude 74

Justice and Development Party (AKP) 2, 3, 5, 32, 35–6, 39, 45, 47, 51, 52, 56, 63, 65, 71, 72, 75–8, 84, 89–90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 103, 106, 130, 141, 142, 146, 147, 150, 158, 162, 174, 175, 176, 183–4, 185, 192, 204, 213, 253, 267, 286, 287, 288, 290, 294

Kaczynski, Jaroslaw 87
Kaiser Wilhelm II 55
Karabuk 11
Karachays 42
Karayilan, Murat 163, 272
  see also Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
Kars
  Battle of 156
Kasimpasa 3, 28, 29–30, 40
Kayseri 63, 64
Kemalism/Kemalist xvi, xvii, 4, 6, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 47, 48, 50, 51–2, 54, 55, 57, 58, 64, 105, 163, 205, 214, 215, 263, 268, 269, 287–8, 294, 295, 298
Kenya 15
Kerry, John 146
Khamenei, Ali 158
Khatami, Mohammad 157
Kiev 258
  see also Ukraine
Kilis 132
Ki-moon, Ban 101
Kirisci, Kemal 88
Kisakurek, Necip Fazil 34–5, 37, 38, 39
  anti-Semitism 39
  Islamism 35
Kobane 121, 122, 126, 218
  2014 siege of 108, 124–6, 226, 227
Konya 63, 64
Korean War 276
Kosovo 15, 50, 232, 250, 251, 254
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) 163
Kurdish
  issue xx, 228, 229, 300
  language 121, 122
  nationalism in the Middle East 163, 205
  nationalism in Turkey 163
  peace process 163
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 160, 164, 199, 200–2, 203, 204, 228
Kurdistan 91, 98, 156, 200, 204, 300
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 125, 199, 200, 202
Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK) 121
Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) 121, 159
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) xviii, 15, 74, 86, 91, 98–9, 108–10, 112, 113–15, 120–5, 127, 130–1, 141, 151, 154, 157, 159–60, 163, 175, 176, 195, 199, 200, 202, 203–4, 217, 218, 219, 223, 225, 226–9, 272, 289, 291, 300
  designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 15
Kuwait 41, 179, 189

laïcité/laicism 12, 26
  see also secularism
Latakia 24, 154
  see also Syria
Latin America 12
Lausanne, Peace Treaty of 1923 33, 43, 215–16
Lebanon 10, 42, 114, 154, 166, 197, 206
leftism/leftists 5, 23, 92, 93, 266
Leigh, Michael x, 83

liberalism/liberal 5, 7, 18, 23, 46, 64, 76, 84, 86, 97, 99, 107, 152, 156, 213, 250, 253, 266, 271, 298, 300–1
liberalisation 85, 86, 139, 195, 204, 281
  see also privitization
Libya 20, 104, 105, 106, 118, 131, 150, 164, 171, 177–8, 179, 184, 185, 189, 236, 271
literacy rate 71
  of Turkey and its neighbours 69
London 10, 12, 41, 43, 56, 100, 186, 197, 299
  see also Great Britain
Luxembourg 74, 183, 279

Macedonia 17, 26, 233, 249, 250, 251, 252
Manbij 126, 221, 227, 228, 272, 289
Marshall Plan 13
Marxism/Marxist 33
Mashal, Khaled 95
Mavi Marmara flotilla incident 101–2
Meciar, Vladimir 74
media 6, 62, 76, 104, 107, 123, 148, 173, 180, 220, 277
  conglomerates in Turkey 8
  freedoms in Turkey 5, 7, 35, 76, 84, 107, 148, 152, 175, 191, 301
  foreign media in Turkey 62, 152, 173
  pro-Erdogan 39, 88, 92, 94, 147, 217, 219, 274, 277, 291, 295, 297
Mediterranean 10, 41, 70, 112, 113, 144, 145, 166, 186, 210, 243, 281, 286
  East 45, 165, 172, 174, 186, 187
Mehmet II 53
Menderes, Adnan 14, 27, 28, 31, 50, 271
Merkel, Angela 66, 79, 253, 274
Miami 220
Middle East
  Kemalist view of 48, 205
  Turkish foreign policy in xvi, xvii
Mogadishu 66–7, 180, 232, 240, 241–4, 246
  see also Somalia
Moldova 232, 258
  Gagauz in 233, 255, 259
Mongolia 65, 67
Montenegro 83, 138, 250
Montreux 259, 260
Morocco 9, 196
Moscow xviii, xix, 11, 16, 17, 20, 24, 41, 56, 61, 114, 128, 131–2, 134, 137–54, 155, 166, 196, 222, 228, 234, 249, 256, 257, 260, 261, 262, 270, 272
  see also Russia
Motherland Party (ANAP) 35, 36
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 262
Mubarak, Hosni 107, 171, 172, 183, 185
Murad IV 156
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
  in Egypt 95
  in Qatar 164
  in Syria 116, 117, 129, 133, 245
  Turkish support for xviii, 20, 21, 96, 133, 173, 178, 179, 183, 188
Mussolini, Benito 12
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 155–6
Myanmar 56, 293

Napoleon I 25
National Freedom and Dignity Party (NPSD) 262
National Intelligence Organization (MIT) 118
National Outlook 32–3, 38, 97, 185
National Salvation Party (MSP) 48
National Security Council (NSC) 77

National Turkish Student Union (MTTB) 38, 150, 287
nativism/nativist
in Turkey xvii, 5, 32, 85, 94, 162, 185, 265, 269, 272
see also populism
NATO xix, 17, 109, 114, 115, 116, 118, 126, 131, 145–6, 147, 152, 157, 160, 162, 222, 224, 251, 271, 272, 274, 279
ties to 16, 19, 20, 100
Turkish membership to 14, 24, 45, 50, 73, 91, 103, 106, 113, 138, 187, 194, 226, 269, 272, 280, 281, 289, 293
neo-Ottomanism/neo-imperialism 284, 285
new Turkey xvi, 2, 7, 8, 265–6
New York City 26, 93
Nicosia 210, 211, 213, 214, 258
see also Cyprus
Nisantasi 28, 29, 30, 40, 93
no-fly zone 91
in Syria 118, 119–20, 128
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 48
North Korea 229, 277
Norway 114

Obama, Barack xvii, 58, 63, 71, 96, 97, 98, 100–2, 103, 104, 105–10, 116, 117, 119–20, 123, 125–6, 129, 130, 135, 145, 146, 161, 176, 196, 205, 217, 221, 223–4, 226, 271
Ocalan, Abdullah 86, 114–15, 120, 163
capture in 1999 15, 114–15
see also Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
Olive Branch operation 221, 270
Olmert, Ehud 95
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) xix, 73, 271, 278, 279
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 57
Osman Bey 9
Ostpolitik 47
Ottoman Empire xv, 5, 9–11, 25, 26, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 51, 52–4, 55, 56, 57, 67, 111, 112, 138, 141, 150, 151, 156, 169, 170, 186, 189, 197, 247, 261, 268, 287, 294
caricaturisation of 50–2
debt 67–8
Pax Ottomania 59
Ozal, Turgut 15, 18, 48, 49, 50, 64, 65, 73–4, 105, 139–40, 141, 187, 238
Ozel, Soli x, 82, 87

Pahlavi, Reza Shah 49, 163
Pakistan 223
Palestinians/Palestine 49–50, 93, 95, 179, 186
Palestinian Authority (PA) 207
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 95
Pamuk, Orhan 28, 29
Papandreou, George 16
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 92, 200, 202
Pentagon 102, 123, 153, 290
People's Democratic Party (HDP) 99
People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C) 113
People's Protection Units (YPG) xix, xx, 108–10, 111, 120, 121, 122, 124–8, 130–1, 132, 146, 148–9, 166, 195–6, 202, 204, 217, 218–19, 221, 223, 225, 226–9, 272, 273, 290, 291–2, 300
Peres, Shimon 94, 95
Philippines 56
Podgorny, Nikolai 141
Poland 87

polarisation xviii, 7, 8, 23, 36, 78, 152, 160, 176, 190, 207, 217, 243, 245, 289, 291, 301
population of Turkey and its neighbours 68, 69, 70–1, 132, 150, 250, 260, 291
populism 4–5, 290
Portugal, 14
Prague 100
  see also Czech Republic
Pristina 50, 254
  see also Kosovo
privatisation
  under Erdogan 65
  under Ozal 64
Putin, Vladimir 128, 132, 141–3, 144, 145–54, 166, 210, 218, 229, 256–7, 260–1, 265, 270, 271, 272, 274, 292, 299

Qamishli 121, 122, 290
Qasr-e Shirin (Zuhab) Treaty 156
Qatar xviii, 21, 118, 134, 164, 178–9, 180, 188–92, 233, 241, 243, 245–6, 270, 288
Quran Belt 63–4
Qutb, Sayyid 33

Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 75, 97
Red Sea 45, 241, 245, 246
referendum
  of 2007 5
  of 2010 xvii, 87, 94
  of 2017 2, 5, 8, 151, 164, 196, 201, 202, 204, 233, 253, 266, 267, 275, 280
Republican People's Party (CHP) 27, 28, 90
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) 213
right wing 79, 85
  in Turkey xvii, 4, 5, 38, 51, 100, 113
Rize 30
Rojava 122, 195, 204, 217, 228, 229, 290, 291
Romania 17, 68, 69–70, 138, 249, 251, 258, 259, 260
Rome 12, 55
  see also Italy
Russia
  annexation of Crimea 261
  historical Turkish ties with 10, 13, 17, 21, 23, 42, 47, 56–9, 137–54
  involvement in Syrian civil war xviii, xix, xx, 111–35, 221
  sale of S-400s to Turkey 147, 153, 161, 221–3, 273
  ties with the Kurds 44, 75, 79, 99, 109, 112, 120–2, 124, 137, 151, 163, 199–200, 203–5, 300
  as Turkey's nemesis 16, 56, 111, 128, 154

S-400 missile defence systems 147, 153, 161, 222, 273
  crisis 153, 221–3
Saadabad Pact 49, 69
Salafism/Salafi 51, 150, 237, 251
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira 14
Sana'a 53
  see also Yemen
Sarajevo 53, 252
  see also Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sarkozy, Nicolas 66, 79
Saudi Arabia xviii, 20, 52, 65, 84, 118, 164, 173, 176, 178–80, 190, 206, 241, 243, 244, 245–6, 251
Schroeder, Gerhard 79
Second World War 10, 13, 27, 30, 44, 69, 135, 138, 162, 183
secularism/secularisation/secular xvi–xviii, 1–5, 6–7, 11–12, 23, 25–38, 50, 52–3, 57, 64, 78, 96, 99, 105, 117, 133, 157,

160, 171, 174, 187, 191, 192, 203, 253, 256, 287, 294, 295, 296, 301
see also laïcité
Selim III 25
Seljuks 63
Serbia 42, 67, 83, 138, 237, 250, 251, 252, 253
Sevres
Syndrome 43–4
Treaty of 1920 43
Sezer, Ahmet Necdet 157, 298
Shamgen Zone 71, 85, 259
Shariati, Ali 33
Shia Muslims 200
Sisi, Abdel Fattah el- 107–8, 172, 173–4, 177, 179, 180, 187, 244, 245, 246
Sledgehammer xviii, 6, 35, 78, 82, 87, 98, 100, 191, 192, 290
see also Ergenekon
Slovakia 74
Social Democrat Party (SDP) 79
social engineering
by Ataturk 7, 34
by Erdogan 35
socialism/socialist 83, 93, 113, 203
Sofia 12, 258, 262
see also Bulgaria
soft power 54 61–72, 86, 88, 89, 103, 111, 174, 184, 188, 191–3, 194, 229, 238, 247, 249, 253, 255
and Turkish humanitarian aid 242
and Turkish TV series 62
Soleimani, Qasem 163
Somalia 66–7, 180, 232, 236, 238, 240, 241–3, 244, 299
African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) 242
Somali Federal Government (SFG) 240, 242–3, 244
South Korea 14, 276
Soviet Union 11, 13, 69, 71, 113, 114, 138, 139, 141, 143, 151, 162, 167, 214, 254, 261
Spain 53, 70, 139, 193, 274–5, 279, 281
Stalin, Joseph 13, 138, 152, 261
Strategic Depth 41–59, 96, 167, 256, 265
see also Davutoglu, Ahmet
Strategic West xix, xx, 271, 275, 278–81, 292–3, 297
Suez Canal 10, 41, 243
Suleyman I 3, 53, 62
Suleyman Shah
tomb in Syria 127
Sunni Muslims 42, 129
Sweden 80, 267
Switzerland 12, 94
Syria
civil war (since 2011) xviii, xix, 110, 111–135, 195, 219, 229, 265, 281, 290
Kurds in 112, 114, 121, 122, 228
Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) 109
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 109, 125, 221
Syrian National Council (SNC) 117
Syrian refugees
in Turkey 58, 132, 133, 195, 291

Talat Pasha 57
Tamerlane 22
tariqats (religious orders)
Naqshibandi 150
Tbilisi 17, 144, 258, 260
see also Georgia
Tehran xviii, 70, 72, 103, 104, 131, 137, 157, 159–66, 200, 204, 270, 293
see also Iran
Tel Aviv 65
see also Israel

terror attacks in Turkey
by ISIS 127, 132, 176
by PKK 74, 176, 291
Thessaloniki/Salonika 26
Torumtay, Necip 15
tourism
in Turkey 92, 140–1, 209, 252, 259, 260
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) 144, 165, 260
True Path Party (DYP) 35–6, 76
Truman Doctrine 13
Trump, Donald xix, 19, 43, 97, 147, 217–29, 269, 273, 289, 290
Tunisia 41, 104, 105, 106, 171, 177–8, 179, 184–5, 232, 236
Turkic languages 139, 254–5, 277
Turkish Airlines 141, 192, 202, 209, 239, 252
and Turkish soft power 64–5
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) xvii, 3, 4, 6, 15, 22, 35, 76, 77, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 128, 174, 176, 190, 191, 218, 219, 221, 290, 291
Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) 239
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) 56, 61, 235, 245, 247, 252
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 64, 184
Turkish Independence War 11
Turkish military 22, 76, 77, 174, 191, 192, 219, 241, 245, 274
(*see also* TAF)
Turkish nationalism 169, 296
Ottoman roots 54
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 70, 212, 214, 233, 257
Turkish Straits 70
Russian ambitions over 13, 138
Ukraine 57, 65, 70, 138, 144, 154, 222, 257, 258, 260, 261
Ulan Bator 65
see also Mongolia
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 20, 164, 173, 176, 177, 179, 180–1, 189, 190, 241–4, 245–6
Trucial States 41, 189
United Arab Republic (UAR) 113
United Kingdom 278
see also Great Britain
United Nations 95
Security Council 101, 103, 131, 161, 180, 187, 233, 239
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 101
United States
Central Command (CENTCOM) 225, 226, 290
Congress 15, 92, 119, 147, 153, 222, 223, 273, 290
European Command (EUCOM) 225, 226
invasion of Iraq 115
involvement in Syrian civil war xviii, 102, 124
and the Kurds 44, 99, 110, 221, 228
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 226
Turkish ties with 15, 89, 92, 103, 120, 218, 223, 224, 292, 300
Uyghurs 275, 276–7
see also Xinjiang

Venezuela 65, 233, 293
Venizelos, Eleftherios 12
Vienna 268
Ottoman siege of 1683 25
Virtue Party (FP) 32

Washington xvii, xviii, xix, 13–16, 17, 23, 27, 44, 50, 58, 71, 77, 88, 89–110, 111, 116,

117–18, 119–20, 123–5, 128–31, 135, 142, 146–7, 153–4, 161, 176, 193, 196, 205, 206, 210, 214, 217–19, 222–3, 225–9, 268, 269, 270–1, 272–3, 275, 276, 280, 283, 292–3, 297
see also United States
Weinreich, Max 121
Welfare Party (RP) 32, 33, 36, 39, 48, 75, 76, 97, 174
weltanschauung 43, 137, 215
Westernisation 9, 12, 25, 26, 34, 37, 153–4

Xinjiang 275, 276–7
see also Uyghurs

Yavuz, Hakan 49–50
Yeltsin, Boris 139
Yemen 164, 170, 242, 243, 244, 246
South 113
Yerevan 214, 215, 258
see also Armenians/Armenia
Yilmaz, Sevki 39
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 57
see also Young Turks
Young Turks 11, 55, 57–8, 169, 195, 197
Yugoslavia 17, 68, 69, 251
War of 1992 251

Zaman 6
Zarif, Javad 162, 164
Zarrab, Reza 220
Zero Problems with Neighbours 46, 47, 54, 58, 115, 116, 196, 265, 270
see also Davutoglu, Ahmet
Zionism 33